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The rapid progress in the number of users and applications in wireless communication have 
led to the problem of growing spectrum scarcity in recent years. This imminent spectrum 
scarcity problem is in part due to a rapidly increasing demand for wireless services and in 
part due to the inefficient usage of currently licensed spectrum bands. Cognitive radio (CR) is 
a new technology that is proposed to improve spectrum efficiency by allowing unlicensed 
secondary users to access the licensed frequency bands without interfering with the licensed 
primary users. A malicious secondary user can decide to exploit this spectrum access 
etiquette by mimicking the spectral characteristics of a primary user, and gain priority access 
to a wireless channel over other secondary users. This scenario is referred to in literature as 
Primary User Emulation Attack (PUEA). 
 
Though quite a lot of research efforts have been focused on the detection and defense strategy 
of PUEA in cognitive radio networks, less attention have been given to combating and 
mitigating PUEA in a cooperative spectrum sensing environment. This dissertation seeks to 
contribute to research in the field of cognitive radio networks through an investigation into 
the impacts of Primary User Emulation Attacks (PUEA) on cognitive radio networks, the 
problem of trust amongst users in the networks and also mitigating the activities of PUEA in 
the network.  
 
An analytical and system model for PUEA in cognitive radio networks is presented and its 
impacts are also studied using Neyman-Pearson Composite Hypothesis Test. The intention is 
to evict malicious users from the network and maximize spectrum utilization efficiency. To 
achieve this, techniques to verify that the source of spectrum occupancy information is from a 
genuine user are proposed.  
 
In a primary user emulation attack, malicious users tend to destruct the spectrum sensing 
process of a cognitive radio network by imitating the primary signal and deceive other 
secondary users from accessing vacant frequency bands. An energy detection cooperative 
spectrum sensing technique is proposed to mitigate this attack. This technique assists in the 
reduction of errors made by secondary users in detecting primary user signals in frequency 
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bands considering the existence of PUEA in the network. The performance of our proposed 
method is compared to an existing energy detection spectrum sensing method that does not 
consider the existence of PUEA in the network. Simulated results show that the proposed 
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Wireless communication has indeed been one of the fastest developing sector of the 
communications industry in recent years due to the fact that wireless applications has steadily 
been on the increase. As a result, many wireless applications and systems operating in 
unlicensed spectrum bands have gradually led to the overcrowding of the spectral bands 
making them scarce and unavailable. However, investigation into the spectrum scarcity 
problems by numerous regulatory bodies around the world, including the United States 
Federal Communication Commission (FCC) and the Independent Regulator and Competition 
Authority (OfCom) in the United Kingdom, have reported that although the demand for 
spectrum will significantly increase in the near future the major problem is not the spectrum 
scarcity but the inefficiency in spectrum usage [1], [2], [3]. 
Hence to address the inefficient spectrum usage and spectrum scarcity problems, a new 
approach for spectrum management is required. This approach should be capable of 
providing wireless access to unlicensed users, also known as secondary users (SUs), by 
allowing them to opportunistically gain access to unoccupied licensed spectrum while 
simultaneously guarantying the rights of incumbent users, also known as primary users (PUs) 
who possesses a “first class” access or legacy rights across the spectrum [4]. This implies that 
a licensed spectrum band can be accessed by a secondary user only if not in use by a primary 
user. This new approach is referred to as Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) [5]. 
The cognitive radio technology [7] [15] [17], plays an important role in ensuring the 
realisation of this DSA paradigm. The concept of cognitive radio was first proposed in 1999 
by Joseph Mitola [7] where cognitive radio was described as software defined radio (SDR) 
[8] which possesses a more flexible approach to wireless communication. A cognitive radio 
has the ability to learn from its environment and intelligently adjust its parameters based on 
what has been learned. So in DSA, a cognitive radio can learn about the spectrum usage 
status of a band and automatically decides if the band is occupied by the primary user or not. 
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The process of learning about the spectrum usage status of a band is called spectrum sensing 
[16] [18] and this spectrum sensing technique plays a pivotal role to ensure a successful DSA. 
During a spectrum sensing process, if a primary user begins to transmit across a specific 
spectrum band occupied by a secondary user, the secondary user is ideally required to vacate 
the spectral band immediately and automatically search for a vacant band. But when there is 
no active primary user activity in the spectrum, all secondary users can enjoy equal rights to 
access the unoccupied spectral band. 
For a secondary user to gain equal rights as the primary user, the secondary user imitates the 
characteristics of a primary user causing the secondary user to behave maliciously. The result 
of this is that other secondary users will identify the ‘malicious’ secondary user as a primary 
user and vacate the occupied spectrum for the malicious secondary user believing it is a 
primary user. In this way, the malicious user gets unrivalled access to the primary user’s 











The term primary user emulation attack was first introduced in [10]. Figure 1.1 shows a 
typical scenario of a PUEA in cognitive radio network environment where the appearance of 
an attacker may block the secondary users (SUs) from accessing the idle channel. The 
Primary User 
Malicious User (Emulating 





Figure 1-1 :- Illustration of primary user emulation attacks in cognitive radio networks 
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presence of PUEA may severely influence the performance of cognitive radio network and 
these calls for some kind of strong security mechanism in the network.  
 1.1 Overview of Dissertation 
1.1.1 Objectives and Motivation 
Cognitive radio technology is seen as a practical potential solution for efficient spectrum 
utilization. A major process in the implementation of cognitive radio network is spectrum 
sensing to determine the existence of spectral holes or the activity of a primary user. But one 
of the main challenges associated to spectrum sensing is the problem of secondary users to 
accurately distinguish primary user signals from PUEA signals. Based on the principle that 
primary users signal possess the priority to access a spectral band, while secondary users 
must always give up access of the spectral band over to the primary user and ensure that no 
interference is caused, there exist the potential for malicious secondary users to mimic the 
spectral characteristics of the primary users in order to gain access to the spectral bands 
occupied by other secondary users. 
In order to resolve the security problems arising from PUEA in cognitive radio (CR) 
networks, the main objective of this research is to develop an efficient technique and defense 
mechanism to mitigate the activities of PUEA in CR networks. This will help in reducing the 
errors made by secondary users in the network and also assist secondary users in successfully 
detecting primary user signals in frequency spectral bands while limiting interference 
between users in the system. This work also aims at improving trustworthiness amongst 
secondary users in the network by proposing a technique to verify if the source of spectrum 
occupancy information is from a genuine primary user in order to identify and evict malicious 
users from the network and maximise spectrum utilization efficiency. This will also assist in 
building a healthy relationship amongst secondary users in the network. 
 
1.1.2 Research Contribution 
This research focuses on the major potential attack that is associated to CR networks which is 
PUEA. The aforementioned attack can wreak havoc to the normal spectrum sensing etiquette 
of a CR network. After identifying and analysing the attack, we discuss methods to mitigate 
it. 
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The contribution this research makes to the field of CR networks is grouped into three 
categories. Firstly, the threats that this attack poses to cognitive radio networks are examined 
and analysed because identifying and understanding these threats are the two important initial 
steps in ensuring a secured CR network. This is achieved by investigating the impacts of this 
attack on the network using analytical method and extensive Matlab simulations. 
Secondly, since spectrum sensing occupancy information is being received by secondary 
users in a CR network, it is imperative to verify if this information is actually from a genuine 
primary user. Without this verification, a malicious user may be able to falsify this spectrum 
sensing information thus denying access to the vacant spectral bands to other secondary 
users. So a technique is proposed to verify if the spectrum occupancy information is from a 
genuine primary user. 
Finally, this research helps to strengthen and increase the performance of secondary users’ 
spectrum sensing by proposing a novel technique to effectively mitigate the activities of 
PUEA in a CR network and compare with other existing published techniques. 
The results of this research will help to control the activities of PUEA and eliminate spectrum 
sensing errors encountered by secondary users in a CR network and also aid in the design and 
implementation of secured and trustworthy CR networks. 
 
1.1.3 Dissertation Review 
This dissertation has been organised into six chapters. In chapter 2, an overview of the 
technical background of cognitive radio networks and its security threats is discussed. In 
chapter 3, the concept of primary user emulation attack is introduced and its impacts on 
cognitive radio networks is investigated and analysed.  
Chapter 4 presents a proposed technique in ensuring trust amongst secondary users in 
cognitive radio networks. Simulation setup and results are also presented. Another technique 
using an effective energy detection cooperative spectrum sensing in eliminating and 
mitigating PUEA in CR networks is proposed in chapter 5. 
In chapter 6, a summary of the dissertation is presented and recommendations for possible 
future research related to this work are discussed. 
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1.1.4 Resulting Peer Reviewed Publications 
The following peer reviewed publications have been derived from the work undertaken 
during this research. These publications are related to the topic chapters covered in this 
dissertation. They are as follows: 
 
 Conference Proceedings 
1. E. Orumwense, O. Oyerinde and S. Mneney, “Improving trustworthiness amongst 
nodes in cognitive radio network” Proceedings of the Southern Africa 
Telecommunication Networks and Applications Conference (SATNAC), Eastern Cape, 
South Africa. August 2014.  
 
Journal Publications 
1. E. Orumwense, O. Oyerinde and S. Mneney, “Impact of primary user emulation 
attacks on cognitive radio networks” International Journal on Communications 
Antenna and Propagation, Vol. 4,  No. 1, April 2014. pp. 19 – 26.  
 
2. E. Orumwense, O. Oyerinde and S. Mneney, Mitigating primary user emulation 
attacks in cognitive radio networks using cooperative spectrum sensing. IETE Journal 
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CHAPTER 2 
AN OVERVIEW OF COGNITIVE RADIO 
 
 
2.0  Objective 
 
The primary objective of this chapter is to introduce and review cognitive radio, cognitive 
radio network architecture and the various spectrum sensing techniques in cognitive radio 
networks. The chapter also aims at examining the various key areas that are associated with 
this work. 
 
2.1  Introduction to Cognitive Radio 
 
The demand for wireless communication services has drastically increased and most of the 
available part of the spectrum is being used by different licensed applications.  With the 
recent advances in the world of wireless communication, cognitive radio technology is seen 
as a potential solution for efficient spectrum utilization by unlicensed users which we may 
also call secondary users (SUs). It has given the opportunity for the secondary users to 
transmit in several licensed bands without causing harmful interference to the primary users. 
As cognitive radio is been actualized and put to practice for our modern day use, a major 
problem it faces is security threats and attacks.  Since cognitive radio works on the basis of its 
two main characteristics; capability and reconfigurability, security threats often build around 
these characteristics.  Most threats that are associated with cognitive radio capabilities are 
those threats that are launched to mimic the primary transmitters and also threats which 
emanates from sending false information or observations related to spectrum sensing. These 
reconfiguration characteristics can be taken advantage of by an attacker whose main purpose 
is to selfishly acquire the spectral band.  
Since cognitive radio is seen as a promising technology in alleviating the spectrum shortage 
problem in wireless communications, we are now faced with new type of security. However, 
it is also important to note that cognitive radio networks face other classic threats which are 
present in other conventional wireless networks. The main difference is in the security threats 
in Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs) resulting from the issue of spectrum access rights [11].  
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Primary user emulation attacks, spectrum sensing data falsification, objective function attacks 
and Sybil attacks are examples of attacks on a cognitive radio network.  
Spectrum sensing data falsification attacks also referred to as Byzantine attacks is an attack 
against routing protocols, in which two or more routers collude to drop, fabricate, modify, or 
misroute packets in an attempt to disrupt the routing services in a cognitive radio network 
[58]. An objective function attack is usually launched at the physical layer of a cognitive 
radio. When the cognitive radio is running to find the radio parameters suitable for that 
environment, the attacker launches an attack to manipulate the parameters it has control over 
so as to enable the results favour its interest. A Sybil attack is a pervasive security threat in 
cognitive radio networks where a single malicious node masquerades multiple identities, and 
behaves like multiple geographically distinct nodes [59]. 
 
Attacks inherited from the traditional wireless networks include Medium Access Control 
(MAC) spoofing, congestion attacks, jamming attacks, beacon falsification attacks, hole 
attacks, jelly fish attacks, hello flood attacks and lion attacks. A description of CRs and CR 
networks, analytical survey of the threats and attacks associated with CR networks will be 
discussed in this chapter. 
 
2.2  Cognitive Radio and Cognitive Radio Networks 
 
The term Cognitive Radio was first presented by Mitola and Maguire in 1999 [7]. Their 
original report has received several opinions and results and since then, the term cognitive 
radio has become overloaded with many potential meanings.  
“Cognitive Radio: A radio or system that senses its operational electromagnetic environment 
and can dynamically and autonomously adjust its radio operating parameters to modify 
system operation, such as maximize throughput, mitigate interference, facilitate 
interoperability, access secondary markets”.  
That definition was adopted by the Federal Communication Commission (FCC) [12], a body 
set up to regulate spectrum usage in the US. Similarly, the International Telecommunication 
Union Radio Communication sector (ITU-R) [13] also defines Cognitive Radio as 
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“A radio system employing technology that allows the system to obtain knowledge of its 
operational and geographical environment, established policies and internal state; to 
dynamically and autonomously adjust its operational parameters and protocols according to 
its obtained knowledge in order to achieve predefined objectives; and to learn from the 
results obtained.” 
Cognitive Radio is based on Software Defined Radio (SDR), which is a radio communication 
system that can potentially tune to any frequency band and receive any modulation across a 
large frequency spectrum by means of as little hardware as possible and processing these 
signals though software. Spectrum can be significantly utilized by granting permission to the 
secondary users to utilize a licensed spectrum when the primary user is not present. The 
practical implementation of this cognitive radio technology enables secondary users to sense 
which portion of the spectrum is available, select best available channel, coordinate spectrum 
access with other users and vacate the channel when a primary user reclaims the spectrum 











What differentiate cognitive radio from other traditional communication paradigms are its key 
















Figure 2-1:- Key functions of a cognitive radio 
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Observes -: Which can also be referred to as self-awareness, a cognitive radio have the ability 
to scan and sense the RF environment for detection of RF activity across multiple bands, 
standards and channels, followed by classification of detection signals.  
Learns -: A cognitive radio can also learn the RF environment, from past decisions and 
observations, so as to be able to anticipate, predict and correct communication standard, mode 
of operation, and RF parameters. Machines learning techniques such as neural networks and 
support vector machines can be used to train these devices not to only learn how to adapt, but 
also how to predict changes in the RF environment. 
Adapts -:  A cognitive radio/device can adapt their operating parameters, such as frequency, 
transmission power, modulation type, etc., to the variations of the surrounding radio 
environment. Before CRs adjust their operating mode to environment variations, they must 
first gain necessary information from the radio environment, a characteristic known as 
cognitive capability.  This characteristic enables CR devices to be aware of the transmitted 
waveform, radio frequency (RF) spectrum, communication network type/protocol, 
geographical information, locally available resources and services, user needs, security policy, 
and so on. 
User needs -: Reconfiguring a CR to provide enhanced communication quality with respect to 
user-defined goals. Such configuration can be, for instance, the choice of wireless radio 
interface to be used for communication, or tuning of the communication system’s parameters 
to suit the user. 
 After CR devices gather their needed information from the radio environment, they can 
dynamically change their transmission parameters according to the sensed environment 
variations and achieve optimal performance, a characteristic known as reconfigurability. A 
cognitive radio incorporates multiple sources of information, determines its current operation 
settings, and collaborates with other cognitive radios in a wireless network. So when CRs are 
interconnected, they form Cognitive Radio Networks (CRNs). 
 
2.3 Cognitive Radio Network Architecture 
 
A cognitive radio network (CRN) is not just a network of interconnected cognitive radios but            
CRN are composed of various kinds of communication systems and networks that can be 
viewed as a sort of heterogeneous network. Cognitive radios in a CRN, has the ability to 
sense available networks and communication systems around it. A typical CRN environment 
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also consists of a primary user or a number of primary radio networks that coexist within the 
same geographical location of a cognitive radio network. A primary network is an existing 
network that is licensed to operate in a certain spectrum band. Hence, a primary network is 
also referred to as a licensed network. The design of cognitive radio network architecture has 
the objective of optimising the entire network utilization, rather than only maximising 
spectral efficiency. 
 
CRNs can be deployed in centralized, distributed, ad-hoc or mesh architectures, and serve the 
needs of both licensed and unlicensed user applications. The basic components of CRNs are 
cognitive users, the primary user, base stations and core networks. These four basic 
components compose three kinds of network architectures in CRNs which are infrastructure, 
ad-hoc and mesh architectures [15]. 
 
2.3.1 Infrastructure Architecture – In an infrastructural based architecture as shown in 
figure 2.2, the cognitive radio base station controls and coordinates the transmission activities 
of the secondary cognitive radio users. The cognitive radio base stations control the 
secondary transmissions over both the licensed and unlicensed bands by collecting all the 
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Based on these collected information, the base stations take a final access decisions for all the 
nodes.  The cognitive user can only access the base station in a one-hop manner. Cognitive 
users under the transmission range of the same base station communicate with each other 
through that base station. Communication between different cells is routed through core 
networks and the base stations have the ability to execute multiple communication protocols 
in order to fulfil the various demands from cognitive users. The channel between the primary 
user and the secondary user is the sensing channel and the channel between the CR user and 
the base station is the reporting channel. 
 
2.3.2 Ad-hoc Infrastructure - In Ad-hoc architecture, as shown in figure 2-3, there is no 
infrastructural support. The CR users communicate directly with each other in an ad-hoc 
manner and information is shared between the cognitive radio users who fall within this 
communication range. Cognitive radio users can either communicate with each other using 
existing communication protocols or by dynamically using spectrum holes. The cognitive 
radio users do not have direct communication channel with the primary user and rely on their 
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2.3.3 Mesh Architecture – This architecture is a combination of both the infrastructure and 
ad-hoc architectures. Cognitive radio users can either access the base stations directly or use 
other cognitive radio users as multi-hop relay nodes. Some base stations may also connect to 
the core networks and function as gateways and since base stations can be positioned without 
necessarily connecting to the core networks, it is more flexible and less costly in planning the 
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 2.4 Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive Radio Networks 
Due to the steadily increasing number of wireless applications, the demand for radio 
spectrum has also been on the increase. This radio spectrum has gradually become a scarce 
resource and therefore it is necessary to proffer methods to effectively utilize the scarce 
spectral band. The cognitive capabilities of a CR are realised in the form of a spectrum 
sensing. This basic function helps CR to learn about the occupancy of spectral bands in its 
environment.  In cognitive radio networks, spectrum sensing is performed by secondary users 
to determine which frequency spectral band is available for use without creating any type of 
interference to the primary user.  
Currently, there are several existing spectrum sensing techniques in literature [16] [18], but 
they can be classified or categorized into the non-cooperating spectrum sensing technique or 
local spectrum sensing technique and the cooperative spectrum sensing technique.  The Non- 
cooperative sensing technique exploits the physical layer characteristics of primary user 
transmissions such as energy, spectral density modulation and cyclostationary properties [19] 
while the cooperative sensing technique tends to improve on the non-cooperative spectrum 
sensing technique by permitting secondary user nodes to exchange spectrum sensing 
information among each other. The local spectrum sensing technique is further categorized 
into energy detection, cyclostationary feature detection and matched filter detection based on 
the sensing method employed in the signal detection process. 
 
2.4.1 Energy Detection 
Energy detection (ED) is the simplest and the most commonly used local spectrum sensing 
technique. Signal detection is achieved by comparing the energy detector’s output to a 
predetermined threshold. Mathematically, the signal detection process can be represented by 








the peak  |𝑌(𝑓)|
2  ≥   𝛌 Decide 𝐻0 or 𝐻1 
𝑋(𝑓) 𝑌(𝑓) 
Figure 2-5:- Block diagram of Energy Detection 
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The received signal 𝑋(𝑡) sampled in a time window is then passed through an FFT device, in 
order to get the power spectrum  𝑋(𝑓). Then the peak of this power spectrum is located and 
after windowing the peak of the spectrum  𝑌(𝑓) is obtained. Then the signal energy in the 
frequency domain is collected and a binary decision is made. 
 
2.4.2 Matched Filter Detection 
Matched filter detection technique is the finest detection technique as it has the ability to 
maximize the signal to ratio noise (SNR) of the received signal in the presence of additive 
Gaussian noise [20]. It is achieved by correlating a known signal with an unknown signal in 
order to detect the existence of the known signal in the unknown signal. In figure 2-6, the 
matched filter input is convolved with the impulse response of the matched filter and the 
matched filter output is then compared with the threshold for primary detection. The 
threshold is calculated by computing the standard deviation of the signal and determining its 
mean and uses it as the threshold. Its usage in cognitive radio is very limited because it 







2.4.3 Cyclostationary Feature Detection 
This feature introduces built in periodicity into the modulated signals because of its sine wave 
carriers. Cyclostationary feature detection utilizes the cyclic feature of a signal to detect it by 
analysing a spectral correlation function. For example, the cyclic autocorrelation function 






Decision Decide 𝐻0 or 𝐻1 
Sampling 
Figure 2-6:- Block diagram of Matched Filter Detection 
 
   15 
 
The signal of a primary user can be detected at low SNR values if the signal exhibits 
cyclostationary properties.  
Figure 2.7 shows the block diagram of cyclostationary feature detection. The cyclic spectrum 
or spectral correlation function (SCF) which is denoted by 𝑆 (𝑓, 𝑎) is obtained by calculating 
the discrete Fourier transformation of the cyclic auto correlation function (CAF), where 𝑎  is 
the cyclic frequency. Detection is finally completed by searching for the unique cyclic 
frequency corresponding to the peak in the SCF plane. The main disadvantage of 








2.4.4 Cooperative Spectrum Sensing 
One of the most pressing issues relating to local spectrum sensing is channel sensing 
reliability [22], which becomes more difficult especially when a secondary user is shadowed 
or in deep fade. To improve on this issue, multiple secondary users can be coordinated to 
perform cooperative spectrum sensing and several recent works have shown that cooperative 
spectrum sensing significantly increases the probability of detection in a cognitive radio 
network. [23] – [25]. Cooperative spectrum sensing is more accurate in detection since the 
problems of multipath fading and shadowing encountered by a single secondary user 
detection has been minimised by secondary users sharing information with each other about 





 FFT 𝑋(𝑓 + 𝑎)𝑋∗(𝑓 − 𝑎) 
        Correlation 
Decide 𝐻0 or 𝐻1 
  𝑋(𝑓) 
Cyclic Frequency 
Detector 
Figure 2-7:- Block diagram of Cyclostationary Feature Detection 
 





Cooperative spectrum sensing can be implemented either in a centralized or a distributed 
fashion [23]. In the centralized sensing, a fusion center (FC) collects the entire spectrum 
sensing information from different secondary users and identifies the available spectrum 
holes and broadcast this information to the secondary users. In the case of distributed sensing, 
the secondary users exchange spectrum sensing information among each other and 
collectively make their own decision on which part of the spectrum is available. 
 
The final decision about the channel occupancy is decided following fusion rules. There are 
many fusion rules that can be applied at the fusion center [17]. The most popular fusion rules 
are the logic OR rule and the logic AND rules. In the logic OR rule, even if one of the 
secondary users reports the channel to be busy, the decision about the channel status will be 
“busy”. In the logic AND rule, a channel is decided to be “busy” if all the secondary users 
report it to be busy and it will be “vacant” if all the secondary users do not sense any activity 
on the channel. 
 
 
 2.5 Security Threats in Cognitive Radio Networks 
 
There are more intruding opportunities open to attackers in cognitive radio technology when 
compared with the traditional wireless networks and as a result of this, security in cognitive 
radio networks has become a more challenging task. Adversaries can now take advantage of 
several vulnerabilities associated with this new technology and cause severe performance 
Figure 2- 8:- Cooperative Spectrum Sensing Scheme 
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degradation. Cognitive radio networks is very similar to other  wireless networks, since the 
operational nature of wireless media is the open air, but it is more vulnerable to attacks 
compared to wired networks. It is also important to note that CRNs faces other classic and 
common threats found in the traditional and conventional wireless networks. The data in 
wireless network maybe eavesdropped without prior notice or the channel maybe jammed or 
overused by adversaries [26], but cognitive radio technology opens more chances to threats 
and attacks due to its intrinsic nature. That means that these new threats and attacks face by 
CRNs arise due to their unique cognitive characteristics. Like any other wireless 
communication technology, a comprehensive analysis of reliability and security challenges in 
CRNs is a very vital step towards the realization of lasting practical solutions. 
 
Although there exist several types of attacks and threats in cognitive radio networks [56] 
[57], primary user emulation attacks is considered to be one of the severe threats to cognitive 
radio systems because of the dangers it poses to spectrum sensing.  This attack will be the 
focus of the next chapter. 
 
 2.6 Chapter Summary 
This chapter introduced and reviewed cognitive radio and its architecture and primary 
functionality. The fact that cognitive radio promises to be one of the favourable solution to 
spectrum scarcity in wireless networks was also examined. Spectrum sensing techniques, a 
major operational aspect of CRNs was briefly looked at. The security threats associated to 
cognitive radio networks was also studied and PUEA which potentially combine all these 
topics together was introduced. Various key areas that are of importance to this work as 
















The main objective of this chapter is to create an overview of primary user emulation attacks 
and investigate the impacts it has on cognitive radio networks. This will be achieved by 
presenting a mathematical formulation for the attack and determining the probability density 
function of the received signals from both the malicious user and the primary user before 
presenting a test to examine the impacts of the attack.  
Identifying the impacts of PUEA on cognitive radio networks is one of the important steps in 




Lately, security issues, in cognitive radio, are gaining more attention from researchers and 
one of the most prominent security issue associated with cognitive radio networks is the 
primary user emulation attacks. This attack was first discussed by Chen et al in [9] and [10] 
and found to pose a great threat to the Dynamic Spectrum Access (DSA) paradigm of 
cognitive radio networks. In a typical DSA paradigm, primary user possess the priority to 
access the spectrum band, while the secondary users must always relinquish access of the 
spectrum band over to the primary users and ensure that no interference is caused. 
Subsequently, if a primary user begins to transmit across a frequency band occupied by a 
secondary user, the secondary user is ideally required to immediately vacate that specific 
spectral band. But when there is no active primary user communication in the spectrum, all 
other users enjoy equal rights to access the unoccupied spectral band. For a secondary user to 
gain equal rights as the primary user, the secondary user has to maliciously modify the air 
interface so as to mimic the primary user’s characteristics. The resultant effect of this is that 
the other secondary users will identify the malicious user as a primary user and as a result 
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vacate the occupied spectral band for the malicious user. In this way, the malicious user gets 
unrivalled access to the primary user’s spectral band. In literature, this kind of attack against 
cognitive radio networks is what is considered as a Primary User Emulation Attack (PUEA) 
[27]. 
Therefore, we can define primary user emulation attack as an attack in cognitive radio 
networks where the malicious user pretends to be the primary user to obstruct idle channels 
by transmitting a similar signal as the primary user [28]. Due to the good (non-malicious) 
secondary user being forced to vacate the spectral band, the network becomes untrustworthy 
because the information regarding the occupancy of the spectrum is now being provided by a 
malicious user.  
In the vein of mitigating PUEA in cognitive radio networks, some research advances have 
been made in countering this attack. Examples are the distance ratio test and the distance 
difference test proposed by Chen and Park in [10], the localization based defense method 
proposed by Chen et al in [9] and the authentication of primary user signal using 
cryptographic and wireless link signatures proposed in [45]. Also is the single-attacker-
defender-scenario in [37] where both the attacker and the defender can apply estimation 
techniques and learning methods to obtain key information of the environment. 
A PUEA can be launched while the spectrum is being sensed or detected by using the energy 
detection method, cyclostationary detection method or matched filter detection method [29]. 
Among these, the energy based detection method is more popular and easier to implement. 
There are two types of primary user emulation attacks which are associated with the primary 
user depending on the aim and purpose of the attack.  
 Selfish PUEA: - The aim of this attack is to maximize attacker’s bandwidth by 
preventing other secondary users from using it. For instance when a malicious user 
identifies a vacant band, it will prevent other secondary users from using that band by 
transmitting signals that resembles the primary signal. 
 
 Malicious PUEA: - This attack aims at obstructing the secondary users from 
identifying and using the vacant spectral bands which causes a complete destruction 
to spectrum sensing process of the cognitive radio network [9] [10]. 
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It should also be noted that PUEA is quite different from jamming attacks because in PUEA 
the malicious user cause secondary users to vacate the spectrum not by creating large 
interference on the spectrum but by transmitting signals that resemble that of a primary user 
thus making them believe that the primary user is transmitting. 
 
3.2 Impacts of Primary User Emulation Attacks in Cognitive Radio Networks 
From the discussion about PUEA in section 3.1, there are several ways PUEA can negatively 
influence a cognitive radio network thereby causing chaos and disrupting the good working 
order of the network. In this section, we present a system model of a cognitive radio network 
which is used to perform our analysis. 
 
3.2.1 System Model of Primary User Emulation Attacks 
 
Considering a system as in Figure 3.1, where all secondary users are distributed in a circular 
grid of radius 𝑅 and the primary transmitter is present at a distance of at least 𝑑𝑝 from all the 
users. We consider energy based detection mechanisms to detect the presence of the primary 
user by measuring the energy signal level in the band and comparing it with a pre-set 
threshold. It order to determine the probability of a PUEA in the system, we make the 















Good Secondary User 
Malicious Secondary User 
Figure 3-1:- A typical cognitive radio network in a circular grid of radius R consisting of good 
secondary and malicious users 
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    That there are 𝑀 malicious users in the system. 
    There is absence of communication or co-operation between the secondary users   in the 
system. In this way, the impact of PUEA on each secondary user can be independently 
analysed. 
    The primary transmitter is at a minimum distance of  𝑑𝑝 from all users and it transmits 
at a power 𝑝𝑡 and the malicious users transmit at a power  𝑝𝑚. Typically, 𝑝𝑚<< 𝑝𝑡 and 
also the co-ordinates of the primary transmitter are known to the malicious users in the 
system. 
    The positions of the secondary and the malicious users are randomly distributed in the 
circular grid of radius 𝑅 and their positions are statistically independent of each other. 
    For any secondary user fixed at polar coordinates (𝑟0, 𝜃0), no malicious users are 
present within a circle of radius 𝑅0 (i.e. Primary Exclusive Region) centered at (𝑟0, 𝜃0). If 
the restriction is not posted then the power received from any subset of malicious users 
present within this grid will be much larger than that due to the transmission from a 
primary transmitter [30]. 
    The RF signals from the primary transmitter and the malicious users undergo path loss, 
log-normal shadowing and Rayleigh fading.  
    The Rayleigh fading is assumed to be averaged out and can hence be ignored [36]. 
    The shadowing random variable from the primary transmitter is  𝐺𝑃
2 = 10
𝜀𝑃




, 𝜀𝑝 represents the logarithmic shadowing in dBs with a zero mean and 
variance 𝜎𝑝
2 following a normal distribution, 𝜀𝑝~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑝
2). 




10 = 𝑒𝐴𝜀𝑗 where 𝐴 =  
ln 10
10
, 𝜀𝑗 represents the logarithmic shadowing in dBs with 
a zero mean and variance 𝜎𝑗
2 following a normal distribution, 𝜀𝑗~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑗
2). 
 We consider a free space propagation model for the signal from the primary transmitter 
with a path loss exponent of 2 and a two-ray ground model for the signal from the 
malicious user with a pass loss exponent of 4. That is the received signal energy of the 
secondary user from the primary user 𝑃𝑟
(𝑝)
, is proportional to 𝑑𝑝
−2 while the received 
signal energy of the secondary user from the malicious users  𝑝𝑟
(𝑚)
, is proportional to 𝑑𝑗
−4. 
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    The PDF of received powers follows a log-normal distribution because a random 
variable which has a log-normal distribution takes only positive real values. 
 
 
3.2.2 Primary Exclusive Region 
The primary exclusive region (PER), which is also known as the keep out region, serves as a 
safety mechanism for primary receivers in a cognitive radio network. It practically gives 
primary receivers an upper hand over other secondary users in the network as the region 
serves as a protection area. This region is void of cognitive transmitters, that is, the secondary 
user network must be deployed outside PER in order to guarantee a certain performance for 
the primary receivers in the region and also ensure there is no interference in the network 
[32]. This type of deployment scheme is suitable to broadcast networks. An example is a TV 
network in which the TV station broadcast in a currently licensed band. Since the TV bands 
are wasted in geographic locations barely covered by the TV signal, secondary devices which 
are cognitive radio users can be able to dynamically access the spectrum provided they do not 
cause any interference to the primary users of the bands. The primary transmitter may be seen 
as the TV broadcaster, and the primary receivers or users as the TV subscribers. It can also 
apply to any other network in which there is one primary transmitter communicating with 
multiple receivers and other scenarios, such as the downlink in a cellular network. Such a 
primary exclusive region has been proposed for the upcoming spectrum sharing of the TV 
band [33]. The secondary users are randomly and uniformly distributed within a network 
radius from the primary transmitter, outside the PER. 
 
3.2.3 An Analytical Model of Primary User Emulation Attacks 
 
Due to the absence of cooperation between secondary users, the probability of PUEA on any 
user in the network is the same. Hence, without loss of generality, we analyse the Probability 
Density Function (PDF) of the received signal of one secondary user. It is often necessary to 
calculate the PDF of the total received signal power, which is the “power sum” of a number 
of simultaneously received signal power. When signal power is on a linear scale, the 
probability density functions (PDFs’) of the individual signal, either from the secondary users 
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or from the malicious users, can be convolved to give the PDF of the received power of all 
the signals all together. 
In figure 3.2, we transform the coordinates of all malicious users such that the secondary user 
of interest lies on the origin. The transformed co-ordinates of the primary will then be 
(𝑑𝑝, 𝜃𝑝). It is important to note that this transformed co-ordinates of the primary user will also 
depend on the actual location of the secondary user of interest and will not be (𝑑𝑝, 𝜃𝑝) for all 
the secondary users. The received power at the secondary user from each of the malicious 
user is independently and identically distributed (i.i.d). This is valid due to the symmetry of 
the system and the fact that the malicious users can be present uniformly in an annular region 
between the centered at (0,0) and radii (𝑅0, 𝑅). Such approximations for analysis of other 
parameters in cognitive radio networks are also made in [27], [31], [32], [34] and [35]. The 
PDF of the received signal at the secondary user due to the primary transmitter and the PDF 




















Good Secondary User 
Malicious Secondary User 
Figure 3-2:- A scenario with transformed coordinates. The secondary user of interest is at (0,0). 
Malicious users are uniformly distributed in an annular region. 
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3.2.4 Probability Density Function of Received Signal 
 
In the circular grid, we consider 𝑀 malicious users to be at the coordinates (𝑟𝑗 , 𝜃𝑗), 1≤ 𝑗 ≤
𝑀. From assumptions stated in section 3.2.1, the position of the 𝑗𝑡ℎ malicious user is 
uniformly distributed in the annular region between 𝑅0 and R, 𝑟𝑗and 𝜃𝑗 are statistically 
independent ∀𝑗. The PDF of 𝑟𝑗, 𝑝(𝑟𝑗) ∀𝑗 is given by [32] 
 
           𝑝(𝑟𝑗) =  {
2𝑟𝑗
𝑅2− 𝑅0
2  ,            𝑟𝑗 ∈  [𝑅0, 𝑅]
       0                    𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒,
                           (3.1) 
 
and 𝜃𝑗  is uniformly distributed in (− 𝜋, 𝜋), ∀𝑗. The received power at the secondary user from 
the primary transmitter,  𝑃𝑟
(𝑝)
 is given by  




2,                 (3.2) 
where the shadowing at the secondary user from the primary transmitter 𝐺𝑝
2 = 10
𝜀𝑝
10, with 𝜀𝑝 
having a mean of  zero and variance of 𝜎𝑃
2,  𝜀𝑝~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑝
2) as mentioned in section 3.2.1. Since 
𝑝𝑡 and 𝑑𝑝 are fixed, the PDF of the received power at the secondary user from the primary 
transmitter,𝑃𝑟
(𝑝)(𝛾), follows a log-normal distribution and can be written as [60] 
           𝑃𝑟






2 } ,                  (3.3) 




              𝜇𝑝 = 10log10𝑝𝑡 − 20log10𝑑𝑝.                  (3.4) 
 
The total received power at the secondary node from all M malicious users is given by 
              𝑝𝑟
(𝑚)
= ∑  𝑝𝑚𝑑𝑗
−4𝐺𝑗
2𝑀
𝑗=1 ,                      (3.5) 
where 𝑑𝑗 is the distance between the 𝑗
𝑡ℎ malicious user and the secondary user and 𝐺𝑗
2 is the 





2 ) as previously explained. Conditioned on the positions of all the malicious users, 
each term in the summation in the right hand of equation (3.5) is a log-normal distributed 
random variable of the form  10
𝑤𝑗
10 , where 𝑤𝑗 ~𝑁(𝜇𝑗, 𝜎𝑚
2 ) and where  
 
   25 
 
              𝜇𝑗 = 10log10𝑝𝑚 − 40log10𝑑𝑗 .                (3.6) 
As explained in [36],  𝑝𝑟
(𝑚)
can be approximated as a log normal distributed variable whose 
mean and variance can be obtained by the Fenton’s method [33]. 
Therefore the PDF of 𝑝𝑟
(𝑚)
 conditioned on the positions of all M malicious user, 𝑝𝑥|𝑟
𝑚  (𝑥|𝒓), 
can be written as 
 
            𝑝𝑥|𝑟




(10 log10 𝑥− 𝜇𝑀)
2
2𝜎𝑀
2 },               (3.7) 
 
where r is the vector with elements 𝑟1…𝑟𝑀 and 𝜎𝑀
2  and 𝜇𝑀 using Fenton’s approximation are 
given as 



















             𝜇𝑀 = 
1
𝐴





2 ) .                              (3.8b) 
The PDF of the received power from all M malicious users, 𝑝(𝑚)(𝑥), can be obtained by 
averaging equation (3.7) over 𝑟1, 𝑟2…𝑟𝑀 and is given as  
 




𝑝(𝑟𝑗)𝑑𝑟𝑗,                           (3.9) 
 
where  𝑝(𝑟𝑗) can be obtained in equation (3.2). Evaluating equation (3.9) is very complex, but 
however, it is seen as a weighted sum of conditional PDF’s, each of which is log-normal 
distributed. Therefore, equation (3.9) above can be approximated as a log-normal distribution 
with parameters 𝜇𝑥 and 𝜎𝑥
2 obtained by applying Fenton’s approximation for the weighted 
sum. The expression for the PDF 𝑝(𝑚)(𝑥) in equation (3.9) is now of the form 




(10 log10 𝑥− 𝜇𝑥)
2
2𝜎𝑥
2 },                          (3.10) 
 
 




 is a log-normal distributed random variable then 𝜇𝑥 and 𝜎𝑥









] − 2 lnE[𝑝𝑟













]),                          (3.12) 
 
From equation (3.7), the conditional expectations,  𝐸 [𝑝𝑟
(𝑚)
|𝒓], and 𝐸 [( 𝑝𝑟
(𝑚)2
) |𝒓] , can both 
be evaluated using the Fenton’s approximation analysis. 𝐸[ 𝑝𝑟
(𝑚)





obtained by averaging 𝐸 [𝑝𝑟
(𝑚)
|𝒓] and 𝐸 [( 𝑝𝑟
(𝑚)2
) |𝒓] over 𝑟1, 𝑟2…𝑟𝑀. So the average 
probability of  𝑝𝑟
(𝑚)
, can be written as, 
𝐸 [𝑝𝑟
(𝑚)





























          
                𝐸 [𝑝𝑟
(𝑚)
|𝒓] = 𝑀𝑒𝐴𝜇𝑗 . 𝑒
𝐴2𝜎𝑚
2
2 .                         (3.13) 
where,  
𝜇𝑗 = 10log10𝑝𝑚 − 40log10𝑑𝑗 = 10log10(𝑝𝑚. 𝑑𝑗
−4). 
 
Substituting 𝜇𝑗 in equation (3.13) results 
 
         𝐸 [𝑝𝑟
(𝑚)




2  .                                    (3.14) 
 
Integrating equation (3.14) over 𝑟1, 𝑟2…𝑟𝑀, 
 

























 .                            (3.15) 
 
Since secondary user is at position (0,0), 𝑑𝑗 = 𝑟𝑗. 
 
      𝐸[ 𝑝𝑟
(𝑚)










































and simplifies to 
 
          𝐸[ 𝑝𝑟
(𝑚)







2 ,                           (3.17) 
                         
From the analysis above, it is seen that the received power at the secondary user from the 
primary transmitter, equation (3.2), the received power at the secondary user from the 
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3.2.5 Using Neyman-Pearson Composite Hypothesis Test to Investigate the Impact of 
PUEA 
 
This test can be used to distinguish between two hypotheses 𝐻1 which indicates that Primary 
transmission is in progress and 𝐻2 which indicates that emulation attack is in progress by 
simply minimizing the probability of successful PUEA for a fixed probability of missed 
detection at a desired threshold. There are two types of errors that the secondary user can 
make in this hypothesis test which are: 
 
False Alarm:  This type of error occurs when the actual transmission is made by malicious 
user but the secondary user decides that the transmission is due to the primary user [61] [62] 
[63]. Too many false alarms in the system results in an inefficient spectrum reuse, so 
controlling the false alarm probability in a network is crucial for efficient spectrum usage. 
 
Missed Detection: The type of error occurs when the actual transmission is made by the 
primary user but the secondary user makes a decision that the transmission is from a 
malicious user [61] [62] [63]. Too many missed detection may lead to collisions of primary 
and secondary user transmission causing inference, so controlling the missed detection 
probability is crucial for keeping interference to the primary user under the permissible limits.  
 
Neyman Pearson Composite Hypothesis test calculates the PDF of received power at the 
secondary nodes due to the primary transmitter and also the PDF of received power at the 
secondary nodes due for the malicious users and the division gives the decision variable 𝑧. 
 
                  𝑧 =
𝑝(𝑚)(𝑥)
𝑝(𝑝𝑟)(𝑥)
 ,                             (3.19) 
 
where 𝑝(𝑝𝑟)(𝑥) is the PDF of the received power at the secondary receiver from the primary 
transmitter following a log normal distribution and 𝑝(𝑚)(𝑥) is the PDF of received power at 
the secondary receiver from malicious users following a log normal distribution. 
The quotient 𝑧  which is the decision variable is compared with the predefined threshold and 
the secondary user makes its decisions based on the following criterion: 
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             𝑧 ≤  𝛌               𝐷1 ∶ Primary user is transmitting
𝑧 ≥  𝛌              𝐷2 ∶  PUEA in progress        
                             (3.20) 
 
The secondary user may take the decision of 𝐷1when 𝐻2 is true and the secondary user may 
also take the decision of 𝐷2 when 𝐻1 is true. Each of these errors has a probability associated 
with it which depends on the decision rule. 
The equation of the probability of false alarm where 𝛌 satisfies the constraint of the 
probability of the false alarm can be written as 
 
            Pr{𝐷1|𝐻2} = ∫𝑍≤𝛌𝑝
(𝑚)(𝑥)𝑑𝑥.                              (3.21a) 
 
While the equation of probability of missed detection where 𝛌 satisfies the constraint of 
missed probability is given as,  
              Pr{𝐷2|𝐻1} =  ∫𝑍≥𝛌𝑝
(𝑚)(𝑥)𝑑𝑥 =  𝛼.                        (3.21b) 
 
Equation (3.21a) can also be seen as the probability of making decision 𝐷1 when 𝐻2 is true 
and Equation (3.21b) as the probability of making decision 𝐷2 when 𝐻1 is true. 
Both equations can also be represented in a shorthand form as  
                                        𝑧<
𝐷1
𝐷2
> 𝛌.                                 (3.33) 
We will only be concerned with the probability of false alarm since in the scenario of the 
probability of miss detection, the malicious user is not transmitting. 
 
 











Values of Parameters used in the simulation 
Parameter Value 
𝑅0 50 m 
𝑅 1 km 
𝑃𝑡 500 w 
𝑃𝑚 40 w 
𝑑𝑝 10 km 
𝜎𝑝 8 dB [37] 
𝜎𝑚 5.5 dB [37] 
 
The theoretical results in figure 3.3 and figure 3.4 are obtained by setting the transmitting 
power of the primary transmitter to 500 w, the distance between the primary transmitter and 
the good secondary user to 10 km, the transmitting power of the malicious user to 40 w. The 
radius of our circular grid is set to 1 km, the secondary user exclusive region to 50 m, the 
variances of the primary and malicious transmissions are taken to be 8 and 0.5, respectively, 
since it is to be modelled as if it is occurring in an urban and suburban environments [38]. 
The number of malicious users is assumed to be randomly distributed around the circular 
grid. The simulation is set to run at 10000 testing times. 
To simulate the PUEA in the network, we consider the same values of the system parameters 
in table 1 with different values of 𝑅0 which is the exclusive distance from the secondary user 
and also making sure that the probability of missing the primary signal stays strictly below 
the required threshold. Increasing number of  𝑀(number of malicious users), is keyed into the 
network and these malicious users are independent and identically distributed (i.i.d) in the 
annulus of the circular grid with radii 𝑅0 and  𝑅. The probability density function of the 
received power from the transmission of all 𝑀  malicious users is calculated based on 
Equation (3.10), including path loss and i.i.d shadowing. 
For each number of malicious users  𝑀, we ran 1,000 simulations. We calculated the false 
alarm probabilities by observing the number of times that the decision statistic meets the 
corresponding decision criterion. 
 
 






Figure 3-4:- Probability density function of received power at the secondary receiver due to the 
malicious user 



































PDF of received power using simulation
PDF of received power theoretically



































PDF of received power using simulation
PDF of received power theoretically
Figure 3-3:- Probability density function of received power at the secondary receiver 
due to the primary transmitter 
 
 







3.2.7 Observation and Discussion 
 
Figure 3.3 and figure 3.4 show the results obtained using Matlab simulations and also the 
theoretical results for the similar setup for the probability density function of the received 
power at the secondary users due to the primary transmitter and the received power at the 
secondary users due to the malicious users. 
From the figure 3.3 and figure 3.4, we can see that result of the probability density function 
using simulations considerably match with the one derived theoretically. The reason for the 
slight mismatch is that the theoretical derivation is for ideal setup and over an unlimited 
duration of time. On the other hand, the testing times for the simulation are limited in number 
and therefore will always have an effect on the simulation settings and also the inherent 
limitations of the Matlab environment should be put into consideration. 
It can also be seen from figures 3.4 and 3.5 that the probability density functions of the 
received power at the secondary user from the primary transmitter and the received power at 
the secondary user from the malicious user differ from one another. As a result, these 

































number of malicious user = 5
number of malicious user = 10
number of malicious user = 15
number of malicious user = 20
number of malicious user = 25
Figure 3-5:- Probability of false alarm at different number of malicious 
users acting on the system. 
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probability density functions can be used in Neyman-Pearson’s Composite Hypothesis Test 
or any other statistical test to identify intruders and impostors in cognitive radio networks. 
They can also be used to investigate the impact of PUEA in the network. 
From results shown in Figure 3.5, it is observed that the probability of false alarm increases 
as the number of malicious users present in the network is increased. This is because for a 
large value of  𝑅0 , 𝑅 tends to be smaller therefore, the malicious users become closer to the 
good secondary users and the total received power from all the malicious users become close 
to that received from the primary. Thus, for a large 𝑅, the total received power from the 
malicious users may not be enough to successfully launch a PUEA in the network. When the 
malicious user 𝑀, is set at 5, we can see that the total power all the malicious users generate 
gives rise to a lower probability than when compared to when 𝑀 is set to a larger value. The 
higher the number of malicious users present in the network, the more power it generates 
resulting good secondary users making erroneous decisions causing a large probability of 
PUEA in the network. From the results shown, we can therefore deduce that for large values 
of 𝑅0, there is an increase in the probability of false alarm with a corresponding increase of 
the number of malicious users this means that high values of 𝑅0 increases the chances of the 
presence of PUEA in the network, so one can find a convenient range of 𝑅0 in which an 
attack would be minimized. 
 
3.3 Chapter Summary 
In this chapter, primary user emulation attack was studied and its impact on cognitive radio 
networks was investigated. This was done by presenting an analytical and experimental 
approach to obtain the probability Density Function (PDF) of the received powers at the 
secondary users due to the malicious users and also due to the primary transmitter in a 
cognitive radio network by a set of co-operating malicious users. The PDF obtained was used 
in Neyman-Pearson Hypothesis Test to show the probability of false alarm in the network. 
Results obtained show that the number of malicious users in the system has a great impact on 
the network causing the good secondary users to suffer degradation in the quality of their 
communication due to the transmission from malicious users. PUEA will be further explored 
in chapter 5 and defensive mechanisms to mitigate it will be employed. 
 
 








The objective of this chapter is to examine the concept of trustworthiness in cognitive radio 
networks and propose techniques to verify if the source of spectrum occupancy information 
in a cognitive radio network is from a true and genuine primary user in order to evict 
malicious users from the network thereby maximising spectrum efficiency. 
4.1 Introduction 
Secondary users’ ability to sense and exploit the spectrum in cognitive radio networks 
imposes a type of attack called primary user emulation attack and also provides an 
opportunity for malicious users to intrude the network and disrupt the performance of 
cognitive radio spectrum sensing [10].  To mitigate such an attack, a trustworthy network can 
be established whereby the trust level of every secondary user node in the system can be 
assessed individually or through a combination with other nodes.  A verification process can 
be carried out to enable secondary user nodes identify the information provided by genuine 
users in the network. This way, the secondary user is sure that the information regarding the 
occupancy of the spectrum is provided by a genuine user and the nefarious activities of 
malicious users are being thwarted. 
In the chapter, a new technique is proposed and analysed to verify the genuineness of 
spectrum sensing information provided by secondary users in a cooperative spectrum sensing 
environment so as to identify malicious users in the system and create a trustworthy network. 
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4.2 Creating a Trustworthy Cognitive Radio Network 
 
Trust is an important factor that cuts across many facets of disciplines and based upon it 
many relationships are formed. Whether it is used for security on recommended systems, the 
issue of trust will help in successful message transmission among network entities. In a 
cognitive radio network, trust amongst its nodes will improve the reliability of the spectrum 
occupancy information of the primary users and ease the decision making process of the 
fusion center in terms of cooperative spectrum sensing.  A malicious user node might detect 
the absence of primary signal and sends false information that shows the presence of a 
primary signal to the fusion center. The fusion center erroneously decides that the primary 
signal is present, this way the malicious user selfishly uses the entire free spectral band [39].  
To curb this menace, a trust value is assigned to secondary user nodes where it will be 
measured by other nodes in terms of the expected genuineness of its information amongst 
other decisions made from the collective information. This can be achieved when a secondary 
node sensing result is always different from all other nodes sensing results. A specific 
scenario is when all secondary user nodes report the absence of a primary user and a specific 
node reports the presence of a primary user. That node is then regarded as a malicious node 
and its sensing result is removed before a final decision is taken by the fusion center. In this 
way, a trustworthy network will be created where by the trust level of every component can 
be assessed individually or through a combination with other nodes.  
In another sense, secondary nodes of a cognitive radio network form a social relationship 
between themselves to help build trust in the network. A set of nodes can form a sub group 
and give positive or negative rating of each other based on their previous encounters in order 
to determine and assess the trust rating of each other. In this way, malicious or untrustworthy 
nodes can easily be detected cooperatively because of their low trust rating. Therefore the 
information originating from these malicious nodes can either be ignored or disregarded 
before the fusion center makes a final decision. Also in a cooperative scenario, a node can 
change its association with a neighbouring node when it finds out that the level of trust value 
of that node has drastically been reduced thus ensuring the network operates in a trustworthy 
manner. 
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In order to ensure a trustworthy cognitive radio network, a robust transmitter verification 
scheme [10] that can distinguish between trustworthy secondary users and malicious 
secondary users is also necessary. In hostile environments, such a mechanism can be 
integrated into the spectrum sensing process of a cognitive radio network to enhance its 
trustworthiness.  
 
4.3 System Model of a Cognitive Radio Network 
Considering a system as in Figure 4.1, where all the secondary and malicious users are 
distributed across a circular grid, with a distance 𝑑𝑃 between the particular good secondary 
user and a primary user and a distance 𝑑𝑀 between a malicious secondary user and a good 
secondary user and the primary user is located at the center of the circular grid. We consider a 
cooperative cognitive radio environment where all secondary users can share their spectrum 
occupancy information and send this information to the fusion center for final decision. The 
secondary users broadcast their location information in order to detect unused spectrum 
bands. We assume that the secondary users can employ some positioning mechanisms to 
acquire positions, e.g., by using the global positioning system (GPS) [54]. The cognitive 
radio user calculates the distance between the secondary user and other users based on 
location coordinates and also calculates the distance based on the received power level from 
the primary user. If the distance calculated using the coordinates considerably matches the 
distance calculated with received power level, then we can consider the user as trustworthy 






























Figure 4-1:- A typical cognitive radio network in a circular grid consisting of all users in the 
system. 
 
4.4  Proposed Techniques 
 
4.4.1 Distance Estimated Based on Location Coordinates 
 
We analyse the proposed system based on location coordinates whereby all secondary users 
broadcast their location information. With this information, the distance between the users 
can be calculated. 
For simplification in calculating the distance between users, we consider the location in a (2-
D) plane, where (𝑥𝑠 𝑖 , 𝑦𝑠 𝑖) are the 𝑥 and 𝑦 coordinates of the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ secondary user,  (𝑥𝑃, 𝑦𝑃) 









Good Secondary User 
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coordinates of the malicious user. The distance 𝑑𝑃 between the 𝑖
𝑡ℎ secondary user and 
primary user is given by 
   𝑑𝑃 = √(𝑥𝑠 𝑖 − 𝑥𝑃)2 + (𝑦𝑠 𝑖 − 𝑦𝑃)2,     for 𝑖 = 1,2,3…𝑁.              (4.1) 
where 𝑖 is the particular secondary user and the distance 𝑑𝑀 between the 𝑀
𝑡ℎ malicious user 
and any good secondary user is also given by 
   𝑑𝑀 = √(𝑥𝑚 𝑖 − 𝑥𝑠)2 + (𝑦𝑚 𝑖 − 𝑦𝑠)2    for 𝑖 = 1,2,3…𝑀.                          (4.2) 
The decision making node can now use the estimated distance obtained using the coordinates 
to determine how trustworthy any of the secondary user in the system can be. 
 
4.4.2 Distance Measured Based on Received Power Level 
 
The whole idea of distance measurement by means of received power level or received signal 
strength (RSS) is based on the assumption that the received power level is a function of the 
transmitting power and distance on the path between two radio devices. The distance between 
the secondary and other users can also be calculated by measuring the received power level 
with a known transmit power level. The received power level, 𝑃𝑟, with a given transmit power 
𝑃𝑡 is given by the equation [40]. 





 ,                            (4.3) 
where 𝑃𝑡 is the transmit power level, 𝐺𝑡 and 𝐺𝑟 are antenna gain of both the transmitter and 
the receiver respectively, 𝐻𝑡 and 𝐻𝑟 are the heights of both the transmitter and receiver 
antennas respectively while 𝐿 is the system loss factor. 





, therefore, the received 
power level will be solely dependent on the transmit power level and distance, expressed as, 
                                𝑃𝑟 = 
𝑃𝑡
𝑑4
 𝑘 .                  (4.4) 
Based on the received power level the distance between the secondary user and the primary 
user is given by 
 
   39 
 





 .                             (4.5) 
Hence, the distance between the users can be estimated based on the received power level. 
The distance calculated using the received power may not be accurate due to noise and the 
impact of channel impediments and some other uncertainty caused by the signal propagation 
environment. However, many researchers still use the received power level based 
measurement method because of its simplicity and cost efficiency. 
The path loss model as proposed in [41] and [42] which is commonly used in received signal 
power based measurements is written as  








.                              (4.6) 
where 𝑃𝑟(𝑑) is the received power at distance 𝑑, 𝑃𝑟(𝑑0) is the received power at the reference 
distance 𝑑0, 𝑛 is path loss exponent, 𝑑 is the distance between the transmitter and the receiver 
[Km], and  𝑑0 is the reference distance [Km]. Due to the large dynamic range of received 
power levels, dBm or dBW units can be used to express received power levels. 
[𝑃𝑟𝑑] = 10. 𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑃𝑟(𝑑)
0.001(𝑊)
     𝑑𝐵𝑚 




)       W, 










                                    𝑃𝑟(𝑑) =  𝑃𝑟(𝑑0) − 10. 𝑛. 𝑙𝑜𝑔 (
𝑑
𝑑0
)   dB,             (4.7) 




)    Km               (4.8) 
𝑃𝑟(𝑑) and 𝑃𝑟(𝑑0) are in dBm units. Equation (4.7) is the so-called simplified log-normal 
shadowing model. Parameters   𝑃𝑟(𝑑0), 𝑑0, 𝑛, are the main parameters for log normal 
shadowing model formula and they define the properties of radio propagation environment. 
For this work, 𝑛 is taken as 2.8 as in [43].  
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In our proposed technique, the distance between a cognitive user and other users is calculated 
based on location coordinates and also received power level. If the distance calculated using 
either proposed methods matches or is extremely close to each other, then the user is regarded 
as a trustworthy user. If otherwise, then it will be regarded as a malicious user. The trust 
value is expected to be close to 1 for trustworthy users and low for untrustworthy or 
malicious users. 
 
4.4.3 Verification of Spectrum Occupancy 
In a typical cooperative cognitive radio network, secondary users sense if a particular spectral 
band is occupied or not before sending its spectrum sensing information to the fusion center 
for a final decision. During this process, it is imperative that these secondary users correctly 
sense that the spectrum is occupied by a primary user instead of a malicious user otherwise it 
will be sending a false spectrum sensing information to the fusion center. As a result, the trust 
of this particular secondary user node will be compromised.  
So to verify the authenticity of the secondary user spectrum sensing information, i.e. to verify 
if the primary user is indeed using a specific spectral band, we propose a verification tag 
technique which involves adding a verification tag to the primary user signal. Ideally, there is 
an FCC rule that says there should be no modification carried out on the incumbent system so 
as to accommodate opportunistic use of the spectrum by secondary users. But if the FCC’s 
major concern is to ensure spectrum efficiency, then this technique should become very 
promising even if the FCC rule is not followed. Unlike the other FCC rules, there is no 
negative impact on the community if this rule is ignored.  We strongly believe that if we can 
demonstrate the significant benefit of this technique, FCC may consider lifting this rule.  
After all, by allowing secondary cognitive radios (unlicensed users) to use licensed spectral 
band, FCC is actually lifting a previously existing rule. Moreover, FCC rules only apply to 
the United States; other countries may not have such a rule. 
 
So in this technique, a verification tag is added to the primary user signal, the secondary user 
retrieves these verification tags from the primary user signal and uses the tag to verify 
whether a spectrum is currently being used by its legitimate owner or not. 
The primary signal generates the following one way hash chain: 
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                   ℎ𝑛  →  ℎ𝑛−1  → . . . →  ℎ1  →  ℎ0,                (3.9) 
 
where ℎ𝑖 = ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ(ℎ𝑖+1) and ℎ𝑎𝑠ℎ(. ) is a hash function. 
The last tag ℎ0 is broadcasted to all users, hence it is known to both the secondary users and 
the malicious users. The subscript 𝑖 of  ℎ𝑖 indicates the time index during which the primary 
user will transmit the tag  ℎ𝑖. At time  𝑡 = 1, which is indicative of a short time window, the 
primary user transmits  ℎ1. Because of the way the one-way hash chain is generated, the 
disclosure of ℎ𝑖 does not lead to the disclosure of ℎ𝑗  for  𝑗 > 𝑖. So between time 𝑡 = 1 
and  𝑡 = 2, the verification tag is simply  ℎ1. That is the primary signal embeds ℎ1 into its 
signal as shown in figure 4.2 and during 𝑡 = 2 and  𝑡 = 3, ℎ2 is embedded in the signals and 
sent out repeatedly. The repetition is necessary because a secondary user might tend to sense 
the spectrum at any arbitrary moment. Once the secondary user senses the particular 
spectrum, it retrieves the verification tag from the signals; then using the current time and 










If the malicious user decides to replay the verification tag into its signal so as to emulate the 
primary user, it will not be successful because the malicious user only replays what is sensed 
from the primary user. Since the goal of ℎ1 and ℎ2 is to prove to the receivers that the 
primary user is using the current spectrum at a specific time  𝑡, so when the specific time 
window expires, the malicious user will be needing the next verification tag to fool the 
secondary users which will eventually not be transmitted if the spectrum is no longer in use 
𝑡 = 1 𝑡 = 2 
 
𝑡 = 3 
𝒉𝟏 𝒉𝟏 
 






Figure 4-2:- Verification tags 
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by the primary user. That means if the primary user is not using the spectrum, ℎ𝑖+1 will not 
be sent out, so the malicious user will not be able to emulate the primary user hence the 
spectrum occupancy is verified. 
 
4.5 Relative Trustworthiness of a User 
 
For spectrum occupancy sensing information to be regarded as trustworthy, it has to be 
received from a trustworthy user. According to the principle of object trust combination, if 
the final values of an object calculated by using significantly different methods are similar, 
then the evaluator places a higher level of trust in the results [44].  
In an unfriendly environment involving malicious users, trust values are assigned to 
secondary users to ascertain and evaluate their behaviour in the network. These trust values 
are assigned to secondary users based on their evaluation of performance using our proposed 
techniques. Each time after cooperation, the behaviour of the selected secondary users will be 
evaluated and the trust value will be updated accordingly. Then these trust values will be 
exchanged periodically between the users in the network. The fusion center often maintains 
and record identities and their corresponding trust values of all secondary users and keeps 
these trust values in its domain.   
If a malicious user masquerades or poses as a primary user, the trust value assigned to that 
specific user with the aid of our proposed techniques can enable the fusion center to verify 
the genuineness of the spectrum occupancy sensing information being carried by that user 
thereby increasing the legitimacy of spectrum occupancy sensing results in the network and a 
more accurate detection of primary signals. 
  
4.6 Simulations and Discussion 
 
We use MATLAB simulation in verifying the proposed technique and evaluate the results. To 
determine the location of both the primary and the malicious user, we considered a 10km by 
10km area for our simulation with 4 secondary users and a malicious user present in the 
network. We assume that each of the 4 secondary users is fixed at 5 km away from the 
primary user with a line of sight transmission. We also generated 100 instances random 
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coordinates for 50,000 samples in the case of their trustworthiness and the distance is 
calculated based on coordinates and received power levels. 
Figure 4.3 and figure 4.4 show the actual and estimated locations based on coordinates of the 
primary user and malicious user, respectively. We can see from figure 4.3 that the estimated 
location of the primary user closely matches its actual location which is 5km apart from the 
secondary users, i.e., the distance of the primary user from any of the secondary users is the 
same. While in figure 4.4, no matter how the malicious user tries to mimic primary user, its 
distance from the malicious user to each of the secondary users does not match considerably.  
Figure 4.5 shows the distance measured between the primary user and a secondary user based 
on coordinates and the distance measured based on received power level of the primary user 
from the secondary user. We can see that both distance measurements matches considerably 
that is an indication that the secondary user is actually communicating with a trustworthy 
user. 
Figure 4.6 shows the trustworthiness of a user in cognitive radio network. As the SNR value 
increases, correspondingly, the trustworthiness also increases.  If the trustworthiness 
increases to 1, then we can conclude that we are communicating with the primary user and 
not the malicious or untrustworthy user. If the trustworthiness is approximately equal to 1, we 
can still conclude that it is a primary user because of some uncertainties which may tend to 
reduce the trustworthiness. Even as the value of SNR increases we can see from figure 4.6 
that the malicious user trustworthiness remains constant at 0.6. Therefore, whatever spectrum 
occupancy information given by that user is not taken into consideration in the final decision 
making process of the fusion center.  
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Malicious user true location
Malicious user estimated location
Figure 4-3:- Location of the primary user based on location coordinates 
 
Figure 4-4:- Location of the malicious user based on location coordinates 
 
 




























distance measured based on location coordinates
distance measured based on received power



























Figure 4-5:- Distance measured between the primary user and secondary user based 
on location coordinates and received power 
 
Figure 4-6:- Trustworthiness of a user in a cognitive radio network 
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4.7 Chapter Summary 
 
Trust and its management are important fields of research due to its employment on trust 
systems and other security and commercial applications.  In this chapter, we propose a 
technique that can be able to verify that the source of a spectrum sensing occupancy 
information is from a genuine primary user and not from a malicious secondary user 
masquerading to be a primary user. This way, malicious users can be evicted from the 
network and spectrum utilization efficiency will be maximized. 
It is seen from our results that high quality and trustworthiness of received spectrum sensing 
occupancy information is very important to the decision maker (fusion center), in cognitive 





















The main objective of this chapter is to effectively mitigate primary user emulation attacks in 
cognitive radio networks. This is achieved by proposing an energy detection cooperative 
spectrum sensing technique in cognitive radio networks to assist in the reduction of errors 
made by secondary users in detecting primary user signals in frequency bands considering the 
existence of PUEA in the network. Our proposed technique is compared to an existing energy 
detection spectrum sensing technique which does not consider the existence of PUEA in the 
network to determine its performance. 
5.1 Introduction 
With the introduction of cooperative spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks, the 
performance of spectrum sensing has greatly improved and there is a more accurate detection 
of primary signals [23]-[25]. However, cooperative spectrum sensing is still vulnerable to 
primary user emulation attacks which disrupt the entire network and cause performance 
degradation. Although, several research works have been proposed in literature to counter the 
various security threats associated to this attack as in [9], [30], [36] – [37],[45] – [47] [66] 
[67], none have been able to successfully combat PUEA in a cooperative spectrum sensing 
environment. 
In this chapter, we establish a model of cooperative spectrum sensing with a PUEA present in 
the network. The PUEA, like other cognitive radio users, also perform spectrum sensing and 
send primary imitative signals when the primary user is absent. We propose a new technique 
to minimize the total error rate in the system by formulating a method of energy detection in 
secondary nodes to detect vacant bands before the fusion center makes a final decision using 
the OR/AND fusion rules. This is done so as to maximize primary user signal detection while 
limiting interference between users in the system. We also determine the optimal decision 
fusion rule that will minimize the total error rate with PUEA acting in the network. We 
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further consider a scenario where the PUEA constantly sends fake signals in both vacant and 
occupied bands in order to selfishly acquire the band thus making the secondary user to 
vacate the existing band. The results obtained from our proposed energy detection 
cooperative spectrum sensing technique is compared to a conventional energy detection 
cooperative spectrum sensing approach which is considered in [48] to determine its 
performance. 
 














Our model, as in Figure 5.1, consists of a PUEA existing in a cognitive radio network with 𝑁 
cognitive radio secondary users and a fusion center. A malicious user or a PUEA is present in 
the network with the objective of deceiving the secondary users. The PUEA is aware of the 





            Secondary User 
           Fusion center     
              Channel between PUEA and 
secondary user 
                Channel between Primary and 
secondary user 
                  Channel between secondary 
user and fusion center     
 
Figure 5-1:- System model of a cognitive radio network with PUEA present. 
 
   49 
 
users employ energy detection for local spectrum sensing to detect spectrum holes and send 
its decision about the presence or absence of a primary user to the fusion center. The fusion 
center receives these decisions from all the secondary users and fuse them by using the 
OR/AND fusion rules to make a final decision. It is assumed that spectrum sensing for 
cognitive radio users is perfect. 
 
Since the PUEA tend to send similar signals like the primary user, we can take √𝑃𝑝𝑥𝑝
𝑘  and 
√𝑃𝑎𝑥𝑎
𝑘 as the signals transmitted by the primary user and the PUEA, respectively with a 
power of  √𝑃𝑝 and  √𝑃𝑎 at the 𝑘th time instant. For simplicity, 𝑥𝑝
𝑘 is assumed to be 
independently and identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex Gaussian random variable with a 
zero mean and a constantly known variance  𝜎𝑝
2. 𝑥𝑎
𝑘 also follows a complex Gaussian random 
distribution with a zero mean and a constantly known variance 𝜎𝑎
2 as well.  
 
We define 𝑦𝑖
𝑘 to be the signal received at 𝑖th secondary user at the 𝑘th time instant. 𝐻0 and 
𝐻1 indicates the presence and absence of the primary user signal in our model while 𝐴0 and 
𝐴1 indicates the absence and presence of the PUEA signal. 
Since it is assumed that the PUEA does not transmit when the primary user is present, there 
will be three possible outcomes of received signal  𝑦𝑖
𝑘, at the 𝑖th secondary user which is 











𝑘 ,       under 𝑧2
𝑛𝑖
𝑘                                   under 𝑧3
                 (5.1) 
 
where 𝑛𝑖
𝑘 is the additive white Gaussian noise at the 𝑖th secondary user with zero mean and 
variance 𝜎𝑛,𝑖
2 ,  ℎ𝑝,𝑖
𝑘  is the channel gain between the primary user and 𝑖th secondary user at 𝑘th 
time instant and ℎ𝑎,𝑖
𝑘  is the channel gain between the PUEA and 𝑖th secondary user at 𝑘th 
time instant. We assume block fading channels with channel coefficients that can be constant 
in every detection time [64]. Therefore, k can be omitted from ℎ𝑝,𝑖
𝑘  and ℎ𝑎,𝑖
𝑘 . From equation 
(5.1),   𝑦𝑖
𝑘 will be a complex random variable under 𝑧𝑗 for 𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, 3}. 
      𝑦𝑖
𝑘 ~ 𝐶𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑗,𝑖
2 )     under 𝑧𝑗,   𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, 3},                        (5.2) 
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2 +  𝜎𝑛,𝑖






2   , 
𝜎3,𝑖
2 =  𝜎𝑛,𝑖
2   . 
 
5.3 Proposed Cooperative Spectrum Sensing Technique against PUEA 
 
In this section, we will introduce a spectrum sensing process that takes into account the 
presence of a PUEA which sends fake primary signals when the primary user is not present. 
In the cooperative spectrum sensing process, every secondary user independently performs its 
local spectrum sensing, makes a binary decision and forwards these binary decisions to the 
fusion center (FC) to make a final decision about the presence or absence of the primary 
signal in the observed frequency band. There are many fusion rules that can be applied at the 
fusion center [49]. For this work, we will use the logic OR and logic AND rules because 
given a targeted probability of detection or a targeted probability of false alarm, each 
secondary user’s threshold can easily be derived. In OR rule, the FC will declare the presence 
of the primary user when at least one of the secondary users detects the primary signal, 
otherwise the frequency band is regarded as vacant. In the AND rule, the presence of the 
primary user is declared by the FC only when all the secondary users detect the primary 
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Figure 5-2:- Cooperative spectrum sensing in cognitive radio networks. 
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Figure 5.2 shows a schematic illustration of cooperative spectrum sensing in cognitive radio 
networks. To evaluate the performance of cognitive radio spectrum sensing, we use the 
probability of detection (𝑝𝑑) and the probability of false alarm (𝑝𝑓) for both fusion rules. 
From the cooperative spectrum sensing algorithm in [68], the probability of detection (𝑝𝑑) 
and the probability of false alarm (𝑝𝑓) for OR/AND fusion rules can be derived. 
For OR fusion rule, the (𝑃𝑑
𝑂𝑅) and (𝑃𝑓
𝑂𝑅) of the final decision made by the fusion center 
using the local spectrum decisions can be written as 
 
      𝑃𝑑
𝑂𝑅 = 1 − ∏ (1 − 𝑝𝑑
𝑖 )𝑁𝑖=1  ,                                                (5.3) 
 
    𝑃𝑓
𝑂𝑅 = 1 − ∏ (1 − 𝑝𝑓
𝑖 )𝑁𝑖=1  ,                          (5.4) 
 
similarly, for AND fusion rule, the (𝑃𝑑
𝐴𝑁𝐷) and (𝑃𝑓
𝐴𝑁𝐷) of the final decision made by the 
fusion center using the local spectrum sensing can also be expressed as 
 
     𝑃𝑑
𝐴𝑁𝐷 = ∏ 𝑝𝑑
𝑖𝑁
𝑖=1  ,                             (5.5) 
    𝑃𝑓
𝐴𝑁𝐷 = ∏ 𝑝𝑓
𝑖𝑁
𝑖=1  ,                                                            (5.6) 
where 𝑝𝑑
𝑖  and 𝑝𝑓
𝑖  are the probabilities of detection and false alarm, respectively, in the local 
spectrum sensing process of any the secondary users in the cognitive radio network. This can 
be expressed as,  
        𝑝𝑑
𝑖 = 𝑝(𝐷𝑜𝑛
𝑖 |𝐻1) ,                            (5.7) 
and 
       𝑝𝑓
𝑖 = 𝑝(𝐷𝑜𝑛
𝑖 |𝐻0) ,                            (5.8) 
 
where 𝐷on
𝑖  indicates that 𝑖th secondary user has decided that primary signal is present and 
𝐷off
𝑖  indicates that 𝑖th secondary user has decided that primary signal is not present.  
Since fake signals are sent by the PUEA when the primary signal is not present, that means 
the PUEA signal will be received by the secondary users under 𝐻0 only.  In the event of an 
attacker, only the probability of false alarm (𝑝𝑓
𝑖 ) will be affected. So involving the presence 
or absence of an attacker 𝐴0 and 𝐴1 respectively in equation (5.8), we then have 
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       𝑝𝑓
𝑖 = 𝑝(𝐷on
𝑖 |𝐴0, 𝐻0)𝑝(𝐴0|𝐻0) + 𝑝(𝐷on
𝑖 |𝐴1, 𝐻0)𝑝(𝐴1| 𝐻0),               (5.9) 
where 𝑝(𝐴0|𝐻0) and 𝑝(𝐴1| 𝐻0) are conditional probabilities regarding the presence and 
absence of fake PUEA attacker signals which are related to the attacker strategy. If the 
primary signals are such that their transmission parameters are recognized by all, e.g TV 
towers, then it is assumed that 𝑝(𝐻0) is known. So we can consider 𝑝(𝐴0|𝐻0) and 𝑝(𝐴1| 𝐻0) 
as constant values. 
For simplicity of notations, we define 
 
         𝑝(𝐴1|𝐻0) =  𝛽 ,                                  (5.10) 
and 
         𝑝(𝐴0|𝐻0) = 1 − 𝑝(𝐴1|𝐻0) =   1 −  𝛽 ,                                     (5.11) 
 
therefore, we can rewrite equation (5.9) as 
        𝑝𝑓
𝑖 = 𝑝(𝐷on
𝑖 |𝐴0, 𝐻0)(1 −  𝛽) + 𝑝(𝐷on
𝑖 |𝐴1, 𝐻0)𝛽                                          (5.12) 
 
5.4 Proposed Energy Detection Based Cooperative Spectrum Sensing with PUEA 
 
Energy detection is the most popular sensing technique in cooperative sensing due to its 
simplicity and no requirement on a prior knowledge of the primary user signal [50]. A local 
spectrum sensing is performed by the secondary users in the presence of PUEA. It is assumed 
that every secondary user adopts the energy detection technique in which 𝑀 samples of the 
energy of 𝑦𝑖
𝑘 are summed during a detection interval, 
       𝑌𝑖 = ∑ |𝑦𝑖
𝑘|2𝑀𝑘=1  .                                             (5.13) 
𝑌𝑖 is compared to a threshold which every secondary user decides locally about the presence 
and absence of a primary user signal. The probability of detection and the probability of false 
alarm for a 𝑖th secondary user in energy detection can be written as: 
       𝑝𝑑
𝑖 = 𝑝(𝑌𝑖 ≥ 𝑇𝑖 |𝐻1) ,                        (5.14) 
      𝑝𝑓
𝑖 = 𝑝(𝑌𝑖 ≥ 𝑇𝑖 |𝐻0) ,                                (5.15) 
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where 𝑇𝑖 is the threshold used in energy detector of the 𝑖th secondary user. Based on equation 
(5.13), 𝑌𝑖 in energy detection is sum of 𝑦𝑖
𝑘 squared represented in equation (5.1). From 
equation (5.2), 𝑦𝑖
𝑘 is Gaussian random variable with zero mean and variance  𝜎𝑗,𝑖
2  under 𝑧𝑗,  
𝑗 ∈ {1, 2, 3}. So 𝑌𝑖 will be compliant with the central Chi-square (𝜒
2) distribution with 2𝑀 
degrees of freedom and parameter  𝜎𝑗,𝑖
2  . 
𝑌𝑖 = {
𝜒2𝑀
2   (𝜎1,𝑖
2 ) ,          under   𝑧1 = {𝐴0, 𝐻1}
𝜒2𝑀 
2  (𝜎2,𝑖
2 ) ,          under  𝑧2 = {𝐴1, 𝐻0}
𝜒2𝑀 
2  (𝜎3,𝑖
2 ) ,          under  𝑧3 = {𝐴0, 𝐻0}
  .                    (5.16) 
In determining the performance of the analyzed spectrum sensing method from the previous 
section, we employ Neyman-Pearson criterion [51] to determine the probability of detection 
using energy detection based cooperative spectrum sensing. Neyman-Pearson technique 
provides a threshold for detection subject to a constant probability of false alarm  𝑝𝑓
𝑖 . Based 
on equation (5.9), we need the values of 𝑝(𝐷on
𝑖 |𝐴1, 𝐻0) and  𝑝(𝐷on
𝑖 |𝐴0, 𝐻0), which can be 
written in energy detection as  
           𝑝(𝐷on
𝑖 |𝐴1, 𝐻0) = 𝑝(𝑌𝑖  ≥  𝑇𝑖 |𝐴1, 𝐻0) ,                                (5.17) 
          𝑝(𝐷on
𝑖 |𝐴0, 𝐻0) =  𝑝(𝑌𝑖  ≥  𝑇𝑖|𝐴0, 𝐻0).                                 (5.18) 
As in [52] we can now rewrite equation (5.7) for energy detection based spectrum sensing as 







 ,                       (5.19) 
where Γ(. ) and Γ(. , . ) are Gamma function and upper incomplete Gamma function [53], 
respectively. Equation (5.12) can also be written as 













𝛽 .                                         (5.20) 
In Neyman-Pearson criterion, it is shown that for a given probability of false alarm, the 
optimal threshold which maximizes the probability of detection can be obtained if the given 
probability of false alarm is the actual considered probability of false alarm. 
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With PUEA considered in our proposed method, we can evaluate the method by comparing it 
to the conventional energy detection spectrum sensing method that does not consider an 
attacker in the system like the one proposed in [48]. In evaluating the system performance, a 
parameter relating to spectrum sensing called probability of error is used. The probability of 
error defines the probability of making a wrong decision in spectrum sensing. That is 
declaring the presence of primary user when primary signal is not present or declaring the 
absence of primary user when primary user is actually sending signals. For OR FC rule, we 
can express the probability of error as 
           𝑝𝑒
𝑂𝑅 = 𝑝(𝐻0 , 𝐷𝑜𝑛
𝑂𝑅) + 𝑝(𝐻1 , 𝐷𝑜𝑓𝑓
𝑂𝑅 ) ,        
            = 𝑝(𝐻0)𝑝𝑓
𝑂𝑅 +   𝑝(𝐻1)𝑝𝑚
𝑂𝑅 ,                                 (5.21) 
we can also express the probability of error in AND FC rule as 
           𝑝𝑒
𝐴𝑁𝐷 =  𝑝(𝐻0)𝑝𝑓
𝐴𝑁𝐷 +   𝑝(𝐻1)𝑝𝑚
𝐴𝑁𝐷  .                     (5.22) 
 
 
5.5 Proposed Technique for the Case of an Always Present Attacker in the Network 
 
There is, an extreme case where a PUEA constantly sends fake signals in the cognitive radio 
environment irrespective of a band being vacant or occupied. That is, we can assume that the 
PUEA performs a kind of spectrum sensing to send fake signals both in vacant and occupied 
frequency band. The effect of these fake signals transmitted constantly by the PUEA will 
destroy the entire spectrum sensing process and prompting secondary users to make 
erroneous decisions and also cause interference in the network [65]. In this case, there will be 
a possible outcome of  𝑧4 = {𝐴1, 𝐻1} where both the primary user and PUEA are both 
transmitting in the cognitive radio environment. Then, 






𝑘,  under 𝑧4,                                        (5.23) 
where  𝑦𝑖
𝑘 is a complex random variable with a mean of zero and variance of 𝜎4,𝑖
2 . 
            𝑦𝑖
𝑘 ~ 𝐶𝑁(0, 𝜎4,𝑖
2 )      under 𝑧4,                                            (5.24) 
and 
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2 +  𝜎𝑛,𝑖
2   
In the presence of a constant attacker sending fake signals over the licensed frequency band, 
PUEA signal will be received by the secondary users under both  𝐻0 and  𝐻1. The probability 
of detection (𝑝𝑑
𝑖 ) is now affected by the presence of an attacker and (𝑝𝑓
𝑖 ) will still be the 
same as analyzed in equation (5.9). The probability of detection, (𝑝𝑑
𝑖 ), is now expressed as 
             𝑝𝑑
𝑖 = 𝑝(𝐷on
𝑖 |𝐴1, 𝐻1)𝑝(𝐴1| 𝐻1) + 𝑝(𝐷on
𝑖 |𝐴0, 𝐻1)𝑝(𝐴0|𝐻1),            (5.25) 
where 𝑝(𝐴1| 𝐻1) and  𝑝(𝐴0| 𝐻1) are now the new conditional probabilities regarding the 
presence and absence of the attacker. If we take 𝑝(𝐴1| 𝐻1) to be 𝛼 for easy notation, then 
 𝑝(𝐴0| 𝐻1) will be  1 −  𝛼 . Equation (5.25) can now be written as  
           𝑝𝑑
𝑖 =  𝑝(𝐷on
𝑖 |𝐴1, 𝐻1)𝛼 +  𝑝(𝐷on
𝑖 |𝐴0, 𝐻1)(1 −  𝛼 ).                (5.26) 
In the same way as in the previous section, formulating the cooperative spectrum sensing 
technique based on energy detection, 𝑌𝑖 will also be compliant with the central Chi-square 
(𝜒2) distribution with 2𝑀 degrees of freedom and parameter  𝜎4,𝑖
2  and is given by 
          𝑌𝑖 ~ 𝜒2𝑀
2  (𝜎4,𝑖
2 ) , under   𝑧4 = {𝐴1, 𝐻1},                    (5.27) 
and  
          𝑝(𝐷on






  ,                (5.28) 
          𝑝(𝐷on






  .                  (5.29) 
So the probability of detection  𝑝𝑑
𝑖  in equation (5.26) can be rewritten as  













 (1 − 𝛼   ).                     (5.30) 
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5.6 Simulations and Discussion 
We implemented the simulations of the proposed energy based cooperative sensing technique 
with the existence of a PUEA in the network and compare the results with the a conventional 
energy based spectrum sensing method which does not consider the existence of a PUEA in 
the network as seen in [48] in order to determine its performance.  
 
 
The channels are assumed to be identically and independently distributed block Rayleigh 
fading and the channel information is assumed to be known to the users in the cognitive radio 
network. The average SNR at every secondary user is set to 0 dB. The number of samples 
within a detection interval is 𝑀 = 3. Since we are aware of 𝑝(𝐻0) and  𝑝(𝐻1) even when 
there is not either CR signal or fake signal, so we consider them as constant known values, so 
𝑝(𝐻0) and  𝑝(𝐻1) are taken as 0.8 and 0.2, respectively. 
Figure 5.3 shows the performance comparison of the proposed energy detection spectrum 
sensing method and the conventional energy detection method. The performance of each 
method is examined by setting  𝑁, the number of secondary users present in the network, to 6 









































Figure 5-3:- Probability of error against the probability of false alarm for the proposed and 
the conventional method with N = 6 using the OR fusion rule. 
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lower probability of error when compared to the conventional method of spectrum sensing. 
The increase of  𝛽, which is the probability of PUEA signal occurrence in the network is seen 




Figure 5.4 also shows the probability of error versus the probability of false alarm for both 
spectrum sensing methods in the OR fusion rule with the number of secondary users 𝑁 
increased to 12. As already known, if there is an increase in the number of cooperating 
secondary users in the system, there will be an increase in the probability of detection or a 
decrease in the probability of error. But it can be observed in the figure that increasing the 
number of secondary users in the network has not reduced the probability of error for the 
conventional method while our proposed method still maintains a very low probability of 










































Figure 5-4:- Probability of error against the probability of false alarm for the proposed 
and the conventional method with N = 12 using the OR fusion rule. 
 
 





In Figure 5.5, our proposed energy detection spectrum sensing method is also compared with 
the energy detection spectrum sensing method considered in [48] for the AND fusion rule 
with number of secondary users 𝑁 set at 6. We can see that the proposed method performs a 
lot better than the conventional method due to the secondary users awareness of fake signals 
in the network hence it has a very low probability of error even when there is an increase 











































Figure 5-5:- Probability of error against the probability of false alarm for the proposed and 
the conventional method with N = 6 using the AND fusion rule. 
 
 






Figure 5.6 also illustrates the probability of error versus the probability of false alarm in the 
AND fusion rule with the number of secondary users 𝑁 set at 12. Due to the increase in the 
number of cooperating users, it is seen that there is an improved performance in our proposed 
method in the presence of PUEA and the conventional spectrum sensing method is severely 
compromised by the presence of PUEA in the network. Also as 𝛽 increases, there is an 
increase in the probability of error for the conventional spectrum sensing method. 
 
Figure 5.7 and figure 5.8 show the performance of our proposed method in the case of an 
attacker constantly sending fake signals to the cognitive radio network in the OR and AND 
fusion rule respectively. Our proposed spectrum sensing method is also compared with the 
conventional spectrum sensing method and the case of no attacker present in the network. 
From both figures, as expected, it is observed that there is a greater performance from our 
















































Figure 5-6:- Probability of error against the probability of false alarm for the proposed 
and the conventional method with N = 12 using the AND fusion rule. 
 
 














































































Figure 5-7:- Probability of error against the probability of false alarm for the proposed and 
the conventional method for an always present attacker using the OR fusion rule. 
 
Figure 5-8:- Probability of error against the probability of false alarm for the proposed and 
the conventional method for an always present attacker using the AND fusion rule. 
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From all the results, we can deduce that the conventional spectrum sensing method using the 
AND fusion rule often leads to a low probability of error in the network. This is so because 
all secondary users must declare the presence of a primary user signal before a final decision 
will be made about the presence of a primary user. Thus, if the conventional spectrum 
sensing method must be used, it should be used under the AND fusion rule. But again, our 
proposed spectrum sensing method has an improved performance over the conventional 
spectrum sensing method in both the OR and AND fusion rules with a much higher 
improvement in the OR fusion rule. In conclusion, we can say that the best possible 
mitigation of PUEA in a cognitive radio network is achieved using the proposed spectrum 
sensing method in the OR fusion rule. 
 
 
5.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter focuses on mitigating one of the common and perilous attacks associated to 
cognitive radio network which is the Primary User Emulation Attack (PUEA). When the 
primary user is not present, an attacker sends primary-like signals in the network. We 
therefore introduced a spectrum sensing technique under PUEA which can enable secondary 
users to make the right decision about the presence or absence of a primary signal in a 
frequency spectrum band. This spectrum sensing technique employs spectrum sensing rules 
(OR and AND fusion rules) at the fusion center to make final decisions in the network. The 
proposed spectrum sensing method is also applied to the case where a PUEA constantly sends 
fake signals in the cognitive radio network. 
The performance of the proposed method is compared with the conventional method which 
does not acknowledge the presence of PUEA in the network. Our simulation results shows 
that a greater improvement in the probability of error for both OR and AND fusion rules can 
be achieved using the proposed method. In order to achieve an optimal performance in 
mitigating PUEA in cognitive radio networks, the proposed method in the OR fusion rule can 












In recent years, technologies and innovations in wireless networks have gained significant 
improvements and the competition for access to the electromagnetic spectrum has 
substantially increased. Thus, wireless technologies needs to cooperate and share the 
electromagnetic spectrum in a non-interfering manner for useful communication. As the 
number of wireless technology users increase, there is an increasing scarcity of spectrum 
resources. Therefore, some regulatory bodies like the Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC) has decided to permit unlicensed (secondary) users to make use of the spectrum 
belonging to licensed (primary) users by employing a cognitive radio (CR). Cognitive radio 
networks (CRNs) monitor available spectrum band, capture their information and 
automatically identify spectrum holes. The most efficient way to identify these spectrum 
holes is by a spectrum sensing process. However, existing spectrum sensing techniques are 
vulnerable to a kind of attack called primary user emulation attack that mimics or 
impersonates the characteristics of a primary user in order to get unrivalled access to the 
spectrum band thereby reducing the bandwidth available to the CRN. In the comprehensive 
research work that has been carried out, we examine the impacts of this attack and propose a 
technique to mitigate it. This will help to effectively differentiate between honest and 
malicious users in the network and greatly improve the security of CR networks. 
 
In chapter 2, the concept of cognitive radio was introduced and its architecture and basic 
functions was presented. Other topics of importance relating to the theoretical foundation of 
this research were also discussed. These included spectrum sensing techniques that are used 
by cognitive radio and also the security threats associated to cognitive radio networks. 
 
In chapter 3, the concept of primary user emulation attack (PUEA) was described and its 
impacts on cognitive radio network were investigated. A system model of PUEA was also 
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presented. We also presented an analysis to calculate the powers and probability density 
function (PDF) of both malicious users and good secondary users. The PDF obtained is used 
in Neyman-Pearsons composite hypothesis test to investigate the impacts of PUEA in the 
network. Our simulated results show that the number of malicious users in the system can 
significantly increase the probability of false alarm in the network resulting in secondary 
users to suffer degradation in the quality of their communication due to the action of 
malicious users in the network. 
 
 In the vein of curtailing the impacts of PUEA in cognitive radio networks, trust among 
secondary users in the network has been established in chapter 4, whereby verification 
techniques are carried out to enable secondary user nodes identify whether spectrum 
occupancy information provided is from genuine users in the network. In our proposed 
verification techniques, the distance between a cognitive secondary user and other users is 
calculated based on location coordinates and also based on received power level. If the 
distance calculated using either proposed methods matches or is extremely close to each 
other, then the user is regarded as a trustworthy user and hence other users can communicate 
with the secondary user but if otherwise, then the user is regarded as a malicious user and its 
spectrum occupancy information will be ignored. We also propose a verification tag 
technique to enable secondary users verify if a primary user is indeed using a specific spectral 
band. This was achieved by adding a verification tag to the primary user signal where the 
secondary user retrieves this tag from the primary user and uses this tag to verify whether a 
spectrum is currently being used by its legitimate owner or not. From our simulated results, it 
is seen that the trustworthiness of a primary user tends to be higher than that of a malicious 
user. That is to say that high quality and trustworthiness of received spectrum sensing 
occupancy information is very vital to the fusion center which is the decision maker on 
presence and absence of a primary users in the network.  
In chapter 5, we have briefly described the cooperative spectrum sensing principle and 
benefit of it increasing the agility in CR networks. We have also extensively researched on 
how PUEA can be extenuated in cognitive radio networks using cooperative spectrum 
sensing. Firstly, a system model of cognitive radio network in the presence of a PUEA was 
presented. Since PUEA primarily disrupts the spectrum sensing process of cognitive radio 
networks, an energy detection cooperative spectrum sensing technique was proposed to evict 
PUEA from the network and also increase secondary user spectrum sensing performance. 
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This proposed technique uses the logic OR and logic AND fusion rules in the fusion center to 
make the final decision about the presence or absence of a primary user in a specific spectral 
band. 
An energy detection based cooperative spectrum sensing technique was also proposed for the 
case of an always present attacker in the network. Our simulation result which was compared 
to a conventional defense technique shows that our proposed method tend to have a lower 
probability of error to that of the conventional method even if the probability of an attacker in 
the network is increased. Again, in our results it was deduced that our proposed energy 
detection cooperative spectrum sensing technique using the OR fusion rule is more effective 
in mitigating PUEA in cognitive radio networks. This can solve the problem of spectrum 
scarcity and unavailability and thus can save millions of dollars.  
 
 
6.2 Future work 
 
The focus of this research work has been on security challenges facing cognitive radio 
networks especially Primary User Emulation Attacks. However, the concept of cognitive 
radio is relatively new and there is still much work to do in this regard. The other areas of 
possible research that maybe explored may include the following: 
 Further investigations into other threats and attacks that cognitive radios networks 
face and possibly introduce efficient prevention techniques to mitigate them. 
 In this thesis, it was assumed that the secondary users have a perfect knowledge of the 
channel state information. More work can be done on the case where there exists 
different channel estimation errors and investigate the corresponding impacts on the 
detection and mitigation performance. 
 Further work can also be done by considering a case when multiple attackers are 
considered in the cooperative spectrum sensing environment and analyse the 
corresponding detection performance. 
 The incorporation of this work into a complete cognitive radio simulator or a physical 
cognitive radio test bed. 
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